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This paper explores the effect of institutions on the economic development of African countries in 2013. 
Previous studies showed opposing results in the past periods, some emphasizing the role of geography, 
others underlining the effects of institutions or policies. According to the analysis conducted in this 
paper using data on 48 countries, institutions can be considered a powerful factor explaining 
differences in development, while geography isn’t significant. The roles of physical infrastructure and 
human capital are also essential.  
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In 2015 the economic situation in Africa appears to be degraded as seen from the mainstream Western 
media. For instance the New York Times released an article entitled “Ebola ravages economies in West 
Africa” (Gettleman, 2014). Parts of the continent are still struggling with epidemics, war or terrorism. 
But is the media coverage really reflecting the reality of the situation?  
For long Africa was seen as a lost cause for economic development, with GDP per capita increasing 
only slightly for decades. Neoclassical models such as the Solow Model proved inefficient in predicting 
the evolution of African economies. However, this situation may be changing as Africa is emerging as 
important economic powerhouse. Africa currently enjoys high GDP growth rates, especially in East 
Africa (The Economist & IMF, 2014). The population of the continent tripled (UN, 2012) since the 
independences and it creates major concerns for economic development, with the risk of a Malthusian 
trap.  
Most African countries remain low-income countries with relatively low exposure to globalization. 
They have to cope with major issues impeding their economic development. But World Bank experts 
expect most African countries to become middle-income nations in a matter of decades (World Bank, 
2014). This relative take-off of the African economies is unevenly distributed, with countries booming 
and others still lagging behind. This is the opportunity to make an updated empirical study on a long-
standing debate in economics: the role of institutions versus other factors, notably geography. Does 
this debate still make sense in the current context?  
Institutions are a concept widely used in economics to analyze the development of African economies. 
Indeed, the particular growth pattern of African countries might be caused by the role of institutions. 
Moreover, as said previously, Africa will be a key contributor to world growth during this century, 
therefore it is a vital necessity to understand the origins of the economic development and disparities 
there. Adequate actions could then be taken to improve the economic situation in Africa.  
For this paper, we will test the hypothesis that the differences in GDP per capita of African countries 
in 2013 can be explained for a large share by differences in institutions, rather than by geographical 
features. The rationale behind this is that good institutions promote growth by creating a climate 
needed for business and capital (human, physical, financial) development, notably with the rule of law 
and political stability.  
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II. Literature Review 
“Institutions rule” (Rodrik) 
 
The economic community is studying the economic development of African countries since the 
independences, that is to say the late 50s – early 60s. Economists struggled to understand why Africa 
didn’t take off and catch up with more advanced economies. Indeed, the Solow Model (Solow, 1956) 
predicts convergence of developing economies through the accumulation of capital, and it didn’t 
happen for Africa. The standard neoclassical Solow Model of economic convergence therefore seemed 
to be unable to predict African patterns, so it pushed economists to claim an African specificity for 
economic development. Attempts have therefore been made to augment the Solow Model in order to 
describe African patterns adequately (Anke E. Hoeffler, 2002). From the beginning of these studies, 
institutions were a major concern. The core of the debate is the opposition between institutions and 
geography, to determine the most prevalent factor on the economic growth and development. 
However, institutions have also been criticized as a cultural bias of the Northern countries to support 
their model of societal organizations (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 
2006). This has been used to conduct “one-size-fits-all” policies and reforms in African countries, 
notably with the support of international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank. 
 
● Institutions as the key factor for understanding economic performance (Robinson, James, 
Daron Acemoglu, and Simon Johnson. “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run 
Growth.”) 
 
In the traditional neo-classical growth models, cross-country differences in factor accumulation are 
due either to differences in saving rates (Solow), preferences (Cass–Koopmans), or other exogenous 
parameters. Although the first wave (Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) and the second wave (Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)), endogenized steady state 
growth and technical progress, variations in growth and income aren’t explained by institutions. 
Acemoglu (2005) tries to address three questions in his paper. Firstly he reviews the evidence that 
institutions lead to growth. Then he wants to understand why institutions vary across countries and 
finally to highlight areas of improvement. Economic institutions determine the constraints and the 
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incentives of key actors in the economic sphere. They influence the structure of economic incentives 
in society (eg: property rights incentivize people to invest in human or physical capital), help to allocate 
resources to their most efficient uses and they determine who gets profits, revenues and residual 
rights of control. So according to Acemoglu (2005) if political institutions can allocate power to groups 
that encourage property rights enforcement, create constraints on power holders and capture a few 
rents by power holders, economic growth is simulated. Acemoglu (2005) also tries to compare the 
impact of geography, economic institutions and culture on the economic growth of a country. Based 
on two case studies (Korea partition and colonization), he concludes that institutions are the most 
important criteria for growth. 
 
● The empirical effects of institutions on the economy (Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, 
and Francesco Trebbi. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and 
Integration in Economic Development.) 
 
Rodrik (2002) tries to compares the impact of institutions, geography and integration on economic 
development. Integration here refers to openness of a country to trade. What makes his study unique 
is his large sample size of 127 countries which is much greater than the previous sample used by 
Acemoglu (2001). Also he separates openness to trade from general governmental policies and tries 
to measure their impact separately.  There are two separate opinions for impact of integration. The 
“Moderate view” supports that once certain institutions are in place, trade can foster convergence. 
The “Maximal view” regards integration as a major factor in the growth of poor countries. Rodrik 
(2002) includes several variables in his work: Institutions (property rights and rule of law), integration 
(% of GDP by trade) and Geography (Distance from equator in degrees). The quality of institutions has 
the greatest direct effect on income (always enters with the correct sign and is statistically significant) 
Controlling for institutions, integration has no direct effect on income, at times entering the regression 
with a negative sign, and geography has a weak direct effect on income. The quality of institutions 
positively and significantly effects integration. Geography also significantly affects the quality of 
institutions and thus, indirectly income. Rodrik (2002) is finally asking questions about the guidance 




● Institutions: the challenge of measurement (Voigt, Stefan. “How (Not) to Measure 
Institutions.”) 
 
Voigt (2009) gives an overview of the difficulty to measure institutions. Indeed, the definition of 
institutions is by nature blurry, as they are often described as “the rules of the game”. It means implicit 
constraints, formal rules and enforcement mechanisms (North, 1990). Institutions can be split in 
different categories, depending on their origin and enforcement mechanism. Glaeser (2004) criticized 
the previous papers on institutions, claiming that they were in fact measuring policies and not 
institutions. Indeed institutions are stable and therefore difficult to measure, unlike policies. Voigt 
(2009) then calls for indicators that focus on particular institutions and objective data, instead of 
surveys and broad concepts. It would allow the analysis of the effects linked to a particular institution 
per se. Unfortunately this kind of data is particularly difficult to obtain, especially for Africa. So most 
econometric works must rely on subjective and aggregate indicators of institutions. Also, the datasets 
recommended by Voigt, for instance from the “Quality of Governance Institute at the University of 
Gothenburg” (Sweden), often include indicators based on the methods he criticizes. 
 
● Institutions and Africa: a vibrant econometric topic (Naudé, W. A. “The Effects of Policy, 
Institutions and Geography on Economic Growth in Africa: An Econometric Study Based on 
Cross-Section and Panel Data.”) 
 
Naude (2004) provides us a relatively recent econometric analysis on the determinants of growth and 
economic development in Africa. However, it is based on quite old historical data (1970-1990). It 
supported the importance of institutions to explain the differences in economic status and confirmed 
the theory of a conditional convergence. It is also comparing different methods of econometric 
analysis. Various factors are discussed to rightfully conduct an econometric analysis for African 
development: geography (landlockness, malaria…), policies (black market, openness to trade…), and 
institutions (corruption…). The choice of the mathematical method (OLS, LAD, and GMM) is found to 
greatly affect the results of the studies. Studying growth instead of stock is also a source of 
underestimation of geography. Finally, Naude (2004) concludes that policies explain most of the 




The contribution of this paper to the literature will be composed of two parts. First, the use of updated 
data to conduct an econometric analysis for the share of institutions in African economic development. 
Then, it will also aggregate the institutions as a single entity, using the newest indicators available. 






















III. Data and Modeling 
 
We chose to study the level of GDP per capita in 2013 as an indicator of economic development. 
Indeed, it seems to be the best option for our trade-offs. First, it offers a good compromise between 
availability of data and analysis of recent trends. Then, GDP per capita allows us to compare countries 
with different populations, as the nominal GDP would differ significantly across countries and wouldn’t 
reflect reality. Finally, studying GDP/capita and not the growth rate of it allows us not to overestimate 
the effects of institutions and underestimate geography (Naude, 2004). To allow dynamic analysis with 
percentages, we chose to study the log of this GDP per capita. Of course, this indicator also has limits: 
we will not get any information about wealth distribution or quality of life (health, education etc). For 
instance, the GDP per capita of Equatorial Guinea is high ($20,581.6 in 2013 according to the World 
Bank) but the wealth extracted from petroleum doesn’t benefit the entire population.  
For our model, we will use the log of this GDP per capita, because the relationships shown by graphs 






As we focus on Africa, the sample is fixed and relatively small. There are currently 54 independent 
countries on the continent, including island nations such as Sao Tome. We excluded non-independent 
entities because they don’t face the same challenges as African countries, for instance the overseas 
département of France (Mayotte) benefits from financial transfers from mainland France. Also, the 
disputed territories are excluded, because of the lack of reliable data, for example the Western Sahara 
territory. Also, some States (Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Somalia and South 
Sudan) are lacking several measurements because of internal turmoil or limits of scope of statistical 
studies. As a consequence, the sample size is reduced to 48, which leads to small sample size issues. 
We also need a reliable definition of institutions. To keep it broad, we will take the definition of 
Kaufman (1999), describing them as “rules of the game”. He distinguished 6 types of institutions: Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. Each component is ranked on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher scores meaning better institutional quality. To test our hypothesis, we will first create a 
simple linear regression model, with only institutions as the independent variable. Then, in a multiple 





III.1. Simple Linear Regression 
 
The most difficult task for this model was to find a reliable indicator for institutions. According to Stefan 
Voigt (2009), it is better to pick indicators that don’t depend on subjective factors, such as surveys of 
corruption. However, such objectives indicators are not easily publicly available, so that’s why we 
switched to survey-based indicators. However, these objective indicators will soon become available, 
for instance with the GI Index of Transparency International.  The World Bank is providing indicators 
ranking institutions. The advantage of these indicators is that they follow the exact definition of 
Kaufmann (1999), as he is working on these indicators himself (WGI, 2014). They are defined on the 
same scale: -2.5 to +2.5, the higher the better the institutions are. So we can average them to get an 
overall institutional quality indicator. Indeed, in this paper we don’t plan to measure the effects of a 
specific institution but rather them collectively, to compare their effects with other relevant factors.  
So our simple linear regression model is: 
 
With log(gdppc), the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in 2013 (World Bank) and coinst the 
average of the Governance Indicators in 2013. (WGI). We obviously expect a positive correlation 
between coinst and log(gdppc). 
Basic statistics about the data of the simple model are summed up in the following table: 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gdppc 48 3023.23 4348.15 226.5 20581.6 
Log(Gdppc) 48 7.28 1.16 5.42 9.93 
Coinst 48 -0.67 0.58 -1.62 0.81 
 
Compliance with Gauss-Markov Assumptions: 
- Linearity in parameters: trivial by looking at the equation and the estimators.  
- Random Sampling: the methodology of the World Bank satisfies this assumption. 
- Sample variation in the explanatory variable (coinst): it can be checked by looking at the 
descriptive table above and the appendix.  
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- Zero conditional mean: Dubious in this case as several important variables are omitted. The 
plotted graph shows skewness.  
 
The sample residuals mean is -3.22x10-09. 
- Homoscedasticity: If we test using the Cameron & Trivedi’s method: 
 
The p-value is greater than 0.05 for heteroskedasticity, so we cannot reject the Null 
Hypothesis. It means that there is significant (5%) evidence to support the fact that 
homoscedasticity is respected. 
As we can see, this model is likely to meet all requirements of the Gauss-Markov Assumptions, with 







III.2. Multiple Linear Regression 
 
In order to enhance our model and to capture the real effects of institutions on economic 
development, several variables will be added. They are chosen in order to limit the omitted variables 
bias, but in a small number not to increase artificially the explanatory power of the model.  
As we have seen in the literature review, different kind of factors can explain economic development: 
institutions, geography, culture, human capital, policies and purely economic factors.  
For the institutions, we will keep our indicator previously described in 4.1. 
We chose to use language proficiency as an explanatory variable for economic development. Indeed, 
the linguistic unity – or disunity – of a country impacts its ability to generate wealth. Broader language 
diffusion helps to ease trade and to reduce social or ethnic tensions within a country. To build the 
indicator, we took the percentage of the population speaking the most widely spread language. The 
source for language proficiency is Ethnologue, a major reference in this field. Of course, the indicator 
suffers from collection error and difficulties with the definition of a “speaker”, notably for Indo-
European communication languages. Also separation between proper languages, dialects and 
mutually intelligible languages is blurry. However, we do expect a positive relationship between the 
maximum proportion of the population able to speak the same language and GDP per capita.  
Another variable for the human capital is the level of instruction. To estimate this, we rely on the 
literacy rates, that is to say the share of the population able to read and write. Indeed, countries in 
Africa achieve very diverse levels of literacy rates so it is still an adequate indicator to judge the quality 
of an education system there. The source is the UNESCO (2013). We do expect a positive correlation 
between literacy rates and GDP per capita.  
A variable is used to describe geography and its impact on economic development. We included a 
dummy variable for access to sea (1 if it has access to a coast, 0 if landlocked). The source is a standard 
map of Africa (see appendix) and by definition the error of this indicator is 0. The fact that a country is 
landlocked also has impacts on trade, disease and climate. So we do expect a positive relationship of 
access to water on the GDP per capita.  
Another explanatory variable of the model is the reliance on natural resources. The indicator linked is 
the percentage of GDP generated by resources rent, that is to say the extraction of energetic resources 
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(oil, uranium) or minerals (diamonds, bauxite, coal…). The World Bank is providing data for this 
indicator, unfortunately the last data is from 2012. What is expected from this variable is unclear 
because resources rent can be a major source of wealth but also lead to the “resource curse” (Auty, 
1990) phenomenon.  
Policy quality is also a major variable to control to evaluate the differences in economic development. 
Obviously, policies are contextual and there is no absolute “good policy”. However, it seems that 
openness to trade is a common indicator for quality of policies (Sachs, 1997). Indeed, it means the 
country has the capabilities to compete on the global market. World Bank published an indicator for 
that, with values available for 2013. As supported by various international trade theories (competitive 
advantage…), we expect a positive relationship between the level of the GDP per capita and the 
openness of the country to trade.  
Another indicator to use as a control variable is the net inflow of FDI per capita in US dollars. Indeed, 
it will have a direct impact on the GDP per capita, as foreign firms favor local development and good 
practices in the economic sphere. It also captures the quality of policies enacted. The source is the 
World Bank (2013) as well.  
Finally, to measure the quality of infrastructure, the rate of electrification is our last variable, that is to 
say the share of population with access to electricity. Indeed, electricity is needed to perform economic 
activities and to allow a decent quality of life for the population. It is also a reliable indicator. The World 
Energy Outlook is publishing them (WEO, 2014). We obviously expect a positive link between the 
electrification rate and the economic development.  
Therefore, we can estimate the new multivariable model: 
 
With: log(gdppc) the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in 2013, coinst the rating of institutions 
in 2013, lang the share of the population speaking the dominant language, lit the literacy rate, sea a 
dummy variable for access to the sea, res the share of exports linked to resource rent, trade the share 







Basic statistics about the variables of the model are summed up in the following table: 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gdppc 48 3023.23 4348.15 226.5 20581.6 
Log(Gdppc) 48 7.28 1.16 5.42 9.93 
Coinst 48 -0.67 0.58 -1.62 0.81 
Lang 48 61.31 25.02 14 100 
Lit 48 64.88 18.78 25.3 94.2 
Sea 48 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Res 48 15.23 14.29 0 55 
Trade 48 65.34 29.53 25.5 142.5 
Fdipc 48 1.48x108 4.29x108 -3.31x108 2.39x109 















Compliance with Gauss-Markov Assumptions: 
- Linearity in parameters: trivial here, as the model is written as stated previously 
- Random sampling: granted by the data collection methods. 
- No perfect collinearity: there is no linear relationship between two independent variables. The 
following correlation matrix between the explanatory variables supports this claim even if 
some correlation levels are quite high:  
 
Correlation coinst lang lit sea res trade fdipc elec 
coinst 1.0000               
lang -0.0239 1.0000             
lit 0.2323 0.4641 1.0000           
sea -0.0468 -0.1863 0.0842 1.0000         
res -0.4656 -0.0097 0.0302 0.1011 1.0000       
trade 0.3482 0.2333 0.3150 0.0181 0.2344 1.0000     
fdipc 0.1020 0.2301 0.3666 0.1762 0.2394 0.5017 1.0000   












- Zero conditional mean: it seems that the regression includes enough different types of 
variables to ensure a zero conditional mean (institutions, geography, human capital, 
infrastructure and policy). However, there is not an excess of variables, so the quality of the 
regression would not be artificially risen. Plotting the residuals of the multiple variable 
regression, we can see that the zero conditional mean is greatly respected: 
 
The sample mean of the residuals is -3.25x10-09. The residuals also seem to follow a normal 
distribution. 
- Homoscedasticity: very likely to be present, as shown in the following test:  
 
According to the Cameron & Trivedi’s test, the p-value is very large, so we cannot reject the Null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Therefore, homoscedasticity is likely to be a property of the model. 
It means that the estimators will have the smallest possible variance.  
So our model fulfills all the Gauss-Markov Assumptions, ensuring unbiased estimators with the 






IV.1. Simple Linear Regression Results 
 
Predicted effect on log(gdppc) 





Number of Observations 48 
R² 0.12 
(2 decimal digits, see appendix for full results, with *** significance at 1%) 
That is to say: 
 
This first regression shows a positive coefficient for coinst (𝛽1 = 0.66855355). Moreover, this 
coefficient is significant at the 5%, and even at the 1% confidence level. It means that an increase of 1 
of the institutions rating is predicted to lead to a 68.55% increase of the GDP per capita. The impact of 
institutions is therefore large. The differences in institutions ratings are moreover quite large among 
African countries (more than 2 points). So this result has explanatory power in reality.  
The intercept is not relevant to our analysis, as we mostly try to study the impact of differences in 
institutions, therefore cancelling out the intercept.  





IV.2. Multiple Linear Regression Results 
(2 decimal digits, see appendix for full results) 
Predicted effect on log(gdppc) 
Independent Variables Coefficients 



















Number of Observations 48 
R² 0.77 
 




That is to say: 
 
 
The R² is high with this regression (77.37%). It seems that the quality of institutions is the main factor 
to explain differences in economic development. It tends to confirm our research hypothesis. An 
increase of the institutions rating of 1 would lead to a 44.18% increase in GDP per capita. The 
institutions coefficient has the highest coefficient, however its significance level is only of 10%.  
Resources seem to be an advantage rather than a “curse” for Africa, with a positive relationship 
(0.0225724) between share of GDP created by resource rent and the log of GDP per capita. So an 
increase of one percentage point of the share of resource rent in GDP is predicted to lead to a 2.25% 
increase in GDP per capita. Indeed, some countries are enjoying high level of development combined 
with a resource based economy, such as Botswana.  Resource rent is very significant (1%). 
Electrification, that is to say physical infrastructure, is also a leading determinant of economic 
prosperity. Indeed, the coefficient is high (0.0185636) with a relatively small variance (1% significance 
level). It means that a progress of one percentage point in electrification rate is predicted to generate 
a 1.85% increase in GDP per capita. It can be argued that electricity is so important because it is 
required to develop advanced economic activities, such as manufacturing, higher education…  
Literacy is also found to have a significant positive effect (0.0.126172) on GDP per capita. Indeed an 
increase of one percentage point of the literacy rate is predicted to increase the GDP per capita by 
1.26%. It is showing the virtuous effect of an educated population, even if the significance level is only 
of 10%. 
Finally, the inflow of FDI per capita seems to have a positive effect on GDP, but to a very small extent 
(4.76x10-10). To have a significant economic effect on the GDP per capita, the increase of FDI per capita 
must be massive.   
Language unity, openness to trade and access to sea seem to have positive effects on GDP per capita, 




However, the literacy rates and the language unity are highly correlated and a joint effect could be 
justified by logic. So we can test for their joint significance. Using a restricted model, we can compute 
the F-Statistic thanks to the formula: 
  
The F test 2.37, however the critical value (with 2 and 39 degrees of freedom, 5%) is higher, at 3.23. 
As a consequence, we cannot conclude that they are jointly significant at 5%. Other possible joint 




















Our study tends to confirm the theory that institutions rule to explain the economic performance of 
African countries. Geography doesn’t appear as an important factor in our regression. Perhaps it is 
because of the general progress of technology and institutions that reduces vulnerability to 
geographical features. Basic human capital development, like achieving high literacy rates, is also still 
important for the African economies. Finally, the physical capital is one of the key factors to improve 
the economies in Africa, for instance the electrification.  
There are several ways to expand this study. The most obvious would be to convey an analysis on 
institutions at the global level, not only for Africa. It would allow us to learn if institutions are reaching 
a “saturation effect”, in other terms if institutions are only important before a certain level of 
development. The question of differences of factors of economic development between developed 
and developing countries could therefore be uncovered. A deeper analysis about the different systems 
of institutions could also be conducted, for instance the property laws. Now that we know that 
institutions have a powerful effect on African countries’ economies, we should also study the impact 


















● GDP per capita in 2013 (World Bank, constant US dollars) 
 
Country Log(gdppc) gdppc 
Algeria 8.58685 5360.702 
Angola 8.662747 5783.402 
Benin 6.69047 804.7001 
Botswana 8.897682 7314.999 
Burkina Faso 6.527812 683.8999 
Burundi 5.587623 267.1 
Cameroon 7.191881 1328.6 
Central African Republic 5.808743 333.2 
Chad 6.960063 1053.7 
Comoros 6.703188 814.9999 
Côte d'Ivoire 7.332304 1528.9 
DR Congo 6.182498 484.2 
Egypt 8.106062 3314.5 
Equatorial Guinea 9.932153 20581.6 
Eritrea 6.298582 543.8 
Ethiopia 6.224558 505 
Gabon 9.356266 11571.1 
Gambia 6.191544 488.5999 
Ghana 7.527363 1858.2 
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Guinea 6.259773 523.1 
Guinea-Bissau 6.3347 563.8 
Kenya 7.127292 1245.5 
Lesotho 7.026072 1125.6 
Libya 9.389716 11964.7 
Madagascar 6.137727 463.0001 
Malawi 5.422745 226.5 
Mali 6.572423 715.1001 
Mauritania 6.974479 1069 
Mauritius 9.127231 9202.502 
Morocco 8.036767 3092.599 
Mozambique 6.405229 605.0001 
Namibia 8.64701 5693.098 
Niger 6.029242 415.4001 
Nigeria 8.0082 3005.501 
Rwanda 6.459435 638.7001 
Sao Tome and Principe 7.383865 1609.8 
Senegal 6.953302 1046.6 
Seychelles 9.691895 16185.9 
Sierra Leone 6.520621 679.0001 
South Africa 8.797533 6617.898 
Sudan 7.469312 1753.4 
Swaziland 8.017703 3034.2 
Tanzania 6.543624 694.7999 
Togo 6.455827 636.4 
Tunisia 8.370247 4316.702 
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Uganda 6.349139 572.0001 
Zambia 7.520126 1844.8 
Zimbabwe 6.860034 953.3999 
 
● Institutions Quality in 2013 (World Bank, CPIA indicators) 
 















Algeria -0,89 -1,17 -0,6 -1,19 -0,68 -0,48  
Angola -1,12 -0,37 -1,26 -1,05 -1,28 -1,32  
Benin 0,12 0,28 -0,55 -0,42 -0,63 -0,83  
Botswana 0,47 1,06 0,28 0,66 0,59 0,92  
Burkina Faso -0,29 -0,75 -0,62 -0,17 -0,53 -0,58  
Burundi -0,97 -1,3 -1,07 -0,87 -1,06 -1,39  
Cameroon -1,04 -0,52 -0,86 -0,93 -1,05 -1,19  
CAR -1,53 -2,15 -1,78 -1,13 -1,83 -1,04  
Chad -1,38 -1,1 -1,5 -1,02 -1,37 -1,28  
Comoros -0,52 -0,24 -1,44 -1,26 -0,99 -0,73  
Congo DR -1,47 -2,23 -1,59 -1,28 -1,55 -1,3  
Côte d'Ivoire -0,77 -1,05 -1,04 -0,73 -0,93 -0,79  





-1,96 0,08 -1,59 -1,44 -1,32 -1,61  
Eritrea -2,15 -0,78 -1,54 -2,23 -1,39 -0,79  
Ethiopia -1,29 -1,39 -0,52 -1,13 -0,62 -0,5  
Gabon -0,86 0,34 -0,77 -0,56 -0,52 -0,56  
Gambia -1,25 -0,05 -0,72 -0,37 -0,59 -0,7  
Ghana 0,41 0,02 -0,09 0,08 0,11 -0,07  
Guinea -1,06 -1,23 -1,32 -1,01 -1,42 -1,06  
Guinea-
Bissau 
-1,41 -0,93 -1,44 -1,3 -1,62 -1,33  
Kenya -0,24 -1,15 -0,49 -0,35 -0,74 -1,06  
Lesotho 0,08 0,33 -0,38 -0,35 -0,26 0,23  
Libya -1 -1,81 -1,5 -1,83 -1,36 -1,52  
Madagascar -0,78 -0,71 -1,12 -0,67 -0,9 -0,69  
Malawi -0,19 -0,22 -0,56 -0,68 -0,19 -0,64  
Mali -0,3 -1,69 -0,84 -0,5 -0,75 -0,73  
Mauritania -0,93 -1,02 -0,9 -0,7 -0,95 -0,68  
Mauritius 0,89 0,94 0,88 0,94 0,9 0,3  
Morocco -0,72 -0,5 -0,07 -0,17 -0,25 -0,36  
Mozambique -0,29 -0,27 -0,65 -0,41 -0,85 -0,65  
Namibia 0,39 0,93 0,19 0,05 0,25 0,3  
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Niger -0,36 -1,3 -0,71 -0,61 -0,75 -0,57  
Nigeria -0,74 -2,08 -1,01 -0,71 -1,16 -1,2  
Rwanda -1,18 -0,08 0 0,03 -0,15 0,65  
Sao Tome 0,11 0,12 -0,74 -0,81 -0,82 -0,38  
Sénégal 0,03 -0,09 -0,48 -0,05 -0,27 -0,28  
Seychelles 0,01 0,87 0,28 -0,29 0,04 0,39  
Sierra Leone -0,39 -0,15 -1,14 -0,69 -0,88 -0,9  
South Africa 0,58 -0,06 0,43 0,41 0,13 -0,12  
Sudan -1,78 -2,2 -1,53 -1,44 -1,25 -1,49  
Swaziland -1,16 -0,44 -0,44 -0,36 -0,42 -0,34  
Tanzania -0,23 -0,15 -0,67 -0,34 -0,5 -0,82  
Togo -0,98 -0,43 -1,37 -0,95 -1,01 -1,04  
Tunisia -0,11 -0,91 0 -0,35 -0,2 -0,15  
Uganda -0,55 -0,84 -0,58 -0,24 -0,36 -1,05  
Zambia -0,11 0,39 -0,48 -0,41 -0,31 -0,39  
Zimbabwe -1,39 -0,69 -1,14 -1,8 -1,57 -1,37  

















Burkina Faso -0.49 
Burundi -1.11 
Cameroon -0.93 
Central African Republic -1.58 
Chad -1.275 
Comoros -0.86 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.885 
DR Congo -1.57 
Egypt -0.91 
























Sao Tome and Principe -0.42 
Senegal -0.19 
Seychelles 0.22 
Sierra Leone -0.69 

















Country Max percentage of the population 
speaking a single language 
Main Language Economic Elite 
Language 
Algeria 71 Arabic French 
Angola 60 Portuguese Portuguese 
Benin 14 Fon French 
Botswana 90 Tswana English 
Burkina Faso 45 Moore French 
Burundi 98 Rundi French 
Cameroon 60 French French/English 
Central African 
Republic 
93 Sango French 
Chad 60 Arabic French 
Comoros 97 Comorian French 
Côte d'Ivoire 70 French French 
DR Congo 45 French French 
Egypt 68 Arabic English 
Equatorial Guinea 86 Spanish Spanish/French 
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Eritrea 50 Tigrinya Italian/English 
Ethiopia 27 Amharic Arabic/English 
Gabon 80 French French 
Gambia 25 Mandinka English/Arabic 
Ghana 35 Akan English 
Guinea 25 French French 
Guinea-Bissau 60 Portuguese 
Creole 
Portuguese/French 
Kenya 19 Kikuyu/Swahili English 
Lesotho 82 Sotho English 
Libya 65 Arabic Italian/Arabic 
Madagascar 77 Malagasy French 
Malawi 44 Chichewa English 
Mali 93 Bamanankan French 
Mauritania 71 Hassaniyya French/Arabic 
Mauritius 90 Mauritian 
Creole 
French/English 
Morocco 60 Arabic French 
Mozambique 50 Portuguese Portuguese 
Namibia 49 Oshiwambo English 
Niger 50 Hausa French 
Nigeria 35 English English 
Rwanda 59 Rwanda French/English 







Senegal 31 Wolof French 
Seychelles 90 French Creole French 
Sierra Leone 82 English English 
South Africa 32 English English/Afrikaans 
Sudan 76 Arabic English 
Swaziland 80 Swati English 
Tanzania 32 Swahili English 
Togo 29 French French 
Tunisia 100 Arabic French 
Uganda 68 Swahili English 
Zambia 28 Bembe English 
Zimbabwe 92 Shona English 
 
 
● Literacy rate in 2013 (UNESCO) 
 
  





Burkina Faso 28.7 
Burundi 86.9 
Cameroon 71.3 





Côte d'Ivoire 56.9 
DR Congo 61.2 
Egypt 73.9 
























Sao Tome and Principe 69.5 
Senegal 49.7 
Seychelles 91.8 
Sierra Leone 43.3 

























● Map of landlocked countries: 
 
 
Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. (UN) 
 
  
● Resource rent as share of GDP in 2013  (World Bank) 
 
 










Central African Republic 8 
Chad 30 
Comoros 3 
Côte d'Ivoire 9 
DR Congo 33 
Egypt 12 
























Sao Tome and Principe 2 
Senegal 5 
Seychelles 0 
Sierra Leone 9 











● Share of Trade compared to GDP in 2013 (World Bank) 
 
 







Burkina Faso 49.7 
Burundi 33.6 
Cameroon 37.9 
Central African Republic 26 
Chad 51.8 
Comoros 50.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 83.6 
DR Congo 38.5 
Egypt 31.9 
























Sao Tome and Principe 54.1 
Senegal 63.3 
Seychelles 115.1 
Sierra Leone 89.4 















● FDI balance per capita in US dollars in 2013 (World Bank) 
 
 
Country FDI FDI per capita 
Algeria 1.69e+09 4.31e+07 
Angola -7.12e+09 -3.31e+08 
Benin 3.20e+08 3.11e+07 
Botswana 1.89e+08 9.43e+07 
Burkina Faso 3.74e+08 2.21e+07 
Burundi 6884807 674981.1 
Cameroon 5.72e+08 2.56e+07 
Central African Republic 800000 173913 
Chad 5.38e+08 4.21e+07 
Comoros 1.39e+07 1.99e+07 
Côte d'Ivoire 3.71e+08 1.83e+07 
DR Congo 1.70e+09 2.51e+07 
Egypt 5.55e+09 6.76e+07 
Equatorial Guinea 1.91e+09 2.39e+09 
Eritrea 4.39e+07 6961746 
Ethiopia 9.53e+08 1.01e+07 
Gabon 8.56e+08 5.04e+08 
Gambia 2.53e+07 1.40e+07 
Ghana 3.23e+09 1.25e+08 
Guinea 1.35e+08 1.16e+07 
Guinea-Bissau 1.45e+07 8530507 
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Kenya 5.14e+08 1.16e+07 
Lesotho 4.49e+07 2.14e+07 
Libya 7.02e+08 1.13e+08 
Madagascar 8.38e+08 3.66e+07 
Malawi 1.18e+08 7221823 
Mali 4.10e+08 2.68e+07 
Mauritania 1.13e+09 2.89e+08 
Mauritius 2.59e+08 1.99e+08 
Morocco 3.36e+09 1.02e+08 
Mozambique 6.70e+09 2.60e+08 
Namibia 9.04e+08 3.93e+08 
Niger 6.31e+08 3.55e+07 
Nigeria 5.61e+09 3.23e+07 
Rwanda 1.11e+08 9388176 
Sao Tome and Principe 1.06e+07 5.30e+07 
Senegal 2.98e+08 2.12e+07 
Seychelles 1.78e+08 1.78e+09 
Sierra Leone 1.44e+08 2.36e+07 
South Africa 8.12e+09 1.53e+08 
Sudan 2.18e+09 5.73e+07 
Swaziland 2.42e+07 2.02e+07 
Tanzania 1.87e+09 3.80e+07 
Togo 8.42e+07 1.24e+07 
Tunisia 1.06e+09 9.71e+07 
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Uganda 1.19e+09 3.18e+07 
Zambia 1.81e+09 1.25e+08 
Zimbabwe 4.00e+08 2.84e+07 
  
 
● Electrification rate in 2013 (World Energy Outlook) 
 
 
Country Share of Population with 





Burkina Faso 16 
Burundi 10 
Cameroon 54 
Central African Republic 3 
Chad 4 
Comoros 45 
Côte d'Ivoire 26 
DR Congo 9 
Egypt 100 
























Sao Tome and Principe 59 
Senegal 55 
Seychelles 97 
Sierra Leone 5 
















































Summary of significance (with 10% as the highest acceptable level): 
Variable Significance Level 
Coinst Yes 10% 
Lang No - 
Lit Yes 10% 
Sea No - 
Res Yes 1% 
Trade No - 
Fdipc Yes 10% 
Elec Yes 1%  
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